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ALL LITTLE SISTERS GOT TO TRY ON BIG SISTER'S CLOTHES:
THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA1
Robin Block
"The time has come for us to carry the can" - George
Thabe, on becoming -first Chairman of the Vaal Community
Council, 1978.
"I cannot allow myself to be used by anybody" - George
Thabe on resigning from the Vaal Community Council, 1981.
INTRODUCTION
The Community Councils Act of 1977 provided for the
establishment of community councils in the African urban
townships - the urban locus for the management and repro-
duction of the African labour force in the cities and towns
of 'white' South Africa. Community councils were to replace
the largely defunct urban bantu councils (UBCS) and
advisory boards in the townships. They were to take over
significant aspects of the execution of state urban manage-
ment - reproduction policy in the townships from administra-
tion boards.
By March 1980, according to the Department of Co-
operation and Development '(CAD) 224 community councils had
been established. Elections had been held in 193 cases,
with an average poll of 41,9%.2 CAD 'facts' and 'figures'
notwithstanding, by 1980 things did not look too healthy
for the community council-. In reality, the period from
1977 - when the first council was instituted in the Vaal
townships - saw the rejection of community councils by the
vast majority of township residents all over South Africa,
resulting in the effective failure of the system - in its
first incarnation, at any rate. The council system was
restructured slightly as part of Koornhof's "new deal" bills
in October 1980 ; massively rejected and sent for
redrafting, the latest version of the community council has
just seen the light of day in the Black Local Authorities
Bill of March this year. This bill has now been sent to a
Parliamentary Select Committee for review.
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This paper examines the community council system, since
1977 and locates it within the broader patterns of changing
state urban management reproduction policy, which is,
arguably, in an ongoing state of crisis.
This crisis of urban policy - "a crisis of state
intervention on the effects of the urban- crisis"3 - has its
roots in the urban crisis of the mid-70's in South Africa.
Before examining the community council system in detail,
we must give some brief indication of the causes and
dimensions of this crisis.
In terms of the provisions of the Bantu Affairs Admini-
stration Act of 1971, 22 Bantu Affairs Administration
Boards (BAAB's) were established by the state in 1972 and
1973 to control and manacre the African dominated classes
in the townships and on the 'white' farms {all areas outside
the bantustans) Created by the'state to co-ordinate more
efficiently the influx of labour into the cities and towns
with the urban reproduction and management of this labour
force in the townships, BAAB's took over from about 4 50 local
(primarily municipal) authorities as the central pivots of
township control. This represented the final centralization
of state urban management-reproduction policy and its
execution. Thus, from 1972-1973 onwards, the BAAB's were
solely responsible - as "agents" of the Department of Bantu
Administration and Development (BAD) and controlled directly
by the Minister of BAD - for the provision, distribution
and management of many of the means of collective consump-
tion in the townships.4
By the mid-701s however, there was effectively an urban
crisis in the townships - a crisis of the management
reproduction of labour power.5 The urban revolt of 1976-7
was both a manifestation and a further cause of this crisis.
Crucial here, were the role of the state's "manager(s) of
collective services, structuring daily life"6; the BAAB's.
The state's intervention in the townships in the early 70's
to secure and extend bourgeois domination and to manage and
reproduce labour power more efficiently - these two functions
are not separate - in the form of. BAAB's had not worked and
had, in fact, merely sharpened urban contradictions - and
pointed them in the direction of the state. The harvest
of BAAB total control - and total neglect - was reaped in
the destruction of its facilities and of its ability to rule
effectively in the subsequent period.7 The urban crisis of
1975-7 forced the state to rethink and replan its urban
management-reproduction policy - in effect as "the urban
component of the overall total reconsideration of relations
towards the popular classes".8 And, in its turn, the
community council system, formed a vital part of the "new"
state urban policy.
This "new" urban policy - deliriously heralded as "reform"
by so many - was premised on a state solution for two
state perceived problems. Firstly the total unprofitability
of collective consumption processes and their management.had
to be tempered somehow. Secondly, the demands of the popular
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classes in this sphere, conjoined as they were (and still are)
with broader political demands, had to.be assuaged, particu-
larly given the growing significance of monopoly capital in
state and economy. The resolution of these problems necessi-
tated greater and intensified intervention by the dominant
classes in the urban sphere in an ongoing and contradictory
programme of reformulated control, disguised as "reform" and
"development". The 'concessions' so ungraciously extended
were only real for small sectors of the dominated classes —
and satisfied no real demands. It is this strategy that has
somewhat backfired in the context of continuing struggle: in
effect redoubling the crisis of reproduction into one of
urban policy.
The post-1976 urban 'reforms' (as connected with 'reforms'
in other spheres) should be seen as aimed at dividing and
controlling the popular classes; at splitting apart the
popular alliance of classes objectively opposed to the capitalist
logic of the management-reproduction of their daily lives;
at co-opting sectors of these classes with material/consump-
tion 'bribes'; at deflecting popular opposition away from
the centres of power in the townships — in essence, at con-
taining and subordinating the struggles of the dominated
classes to maintain political domination and to smooth the
path for accumulation — as the conomy began to recover and
monopoly capital's need (stemming from the labour process
itself) for 'better' management-reproduction of a more skilled
workforce grew.. And, of course, where 'reforms1 would not
suffice, naked repression just had to do: the balance always
shifting in the class struggle.
LEGISLATION — AND MOTIVATION
The Community Councils Act (No. 25 of 1977) was passed in
June 1977. It was the first real shot in the onslaught by
the dominated classes on the urban question post-1976, and
was followed in August by the appointment of the Riekert
Commission, and in September by that of a Cabinet Committee
to investigate the position of urban Africans. This flurry
of 'reformism1 and investigation did not mean that struggle
was only being conducted by the cominant classes in the
period however: 'unrest1 continued in the townships and
rural areas and the Act's promulgation was immediately pre-
ceded by the SSRC's successful rents campaign and the oust-
ing of the Soweto UBC.9 Ine June too, the Committee of Ten
emerged, rejecting community councils and any dealings with
WRAB. The body would negotiate only with the Prime Minister,
it stated. In the following month, the Committee drew up a
'blueprint1 for the running of Soweto, providing basically
for an autonomous City Council of 50 members which would
receive state funding, with powers to pass by-laws, draw up
its own budget and delegate powers to an executive.
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A public meeting to present this to Soweto's inhabitants
was prohibited by the state on two occasions.10 The
state's new dispensation for urban. Africans to 'rule' their
own townships was thus born amidst continuing popular
organisation and mobilization. And from the. outset, it was
only the townships that were to be 'ruled1: as Vorster
stated while discussing the community councils in Parliament
in early 1977, "the urban ... Bantu will have to exercise
his political rights in the homelands."11 Both continuing
struggle by the dominated classes and an emphasis on the
exercising of political rights in the bantustans by the
state were to characterise the community councils era.
According to the Riekert Report, the central aim of the
Community Councils Act was to provide
"the creation of responsible independent bodies
with meaningful executive powers, which could
function and develop alongside administration
boards.1'12
Thus the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development13
was to establish a community council in a township by a notice
in the Gazette, after consultation with the relevant
administration board1 *• , and existing advisory board or UBC
in that township.
According to the Act, this council was to consist of
members elected by the inhabitants eligible to vote —
this determined by the Minister too, and usually in prac-
tice consisting of those registered tenants with Section 10
qualifications — including in some cases hostel dwellers.
From the start then, ministerial control was to be total:
the Minister was to establish the council; decide, after
consultation with the board and UBC, what powers it was to
have; was able to dissolve it or take away its powers;
could make regulations in regard to elections, periods of
office, conditions of service, conduct of meetings,
employment, finance or anything else which affected its
operation and, originally, was able to appoint members if
there were not enough to go round.15
The powers a council could have were limited by statute,
and were "subject to the Minister's directions"- These
were, inter alia:
" (i) the allocation and administration of the
letting"of accommodation to single persons
as if they were single;
(ii) the allocation and administration of the
letting of dwellings, buildings and other
structures;
(iii) the prevention and combating of the unlawful
occupation of land and buildings;
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(iv) the allocation and administration of. sites
for church, school or trading purposes;
(v) the approval of building plans of private
dwellings and the removal or demolition
of unauthorised or abandoned buildings or
structures;
(vi) the prohibition, regulation or restriction
of the keeping of animals, except dogs;
(vii) the control over the keeping of dogs and the
imposition of a (dog) levy i. .. ;
(viii) the promotion of the moral~and social welfare
of persons living in its area;
(ix) the promotion of sound community development
in its area;
(x) the beautifying of and the tidiness of the
area;
(xi) the administration of sport and recreational
facilities;
" (xii) the administration of library services;
(xiii) the award of bursaries;
(xiv) the maintenance of services determined by
the Minister.Ml7
The council could also control and manage a community
guard; make recommendations to the Minister about transport
services, educational matters and township regulations;
"advise" and assist bantustan representatives in the township;
impose levies after consultation with the Minister; appoint
committees and staff; designate members to act on school
boards and most importantly, according to Section 5 (1) (n)
of the Act, be given powers by the Minister not specified
in the original Act, after consultation with the appropriate
administration board. The councils were to be financed via
the administration board with the same sources that the
latter received: rents, liquor and beer sales, fines, etc.
Quite clearly, the legislation did not provide for
meaningful 'self-rule1 for townships in any way. If any-
thing, power was to be even more centralized than before —
at the very apex of the Department of BAD and its predeces-
sors (this reflecting overall state restructuring). The
councils were to represent nothing more than vaguely
cranked-up UBCs — without even the latter's powers (never
really used in practice) over influx control and medical and
health services. It is little wonder that their advent was
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not exactly greeted with joy in South Africa's townships.
Most obviously, the community council strategy
represented a form of attempted state restructuring at the
local level -.on the part of the dominant classes — in
response, largely, to the intensified popular struggles of
the 70's. Community councils emerged as the latest in a
long line of state-created vehicles for co-option and
incorporation, diversion and fragmentation and, ultimately,
division'and control of the African dominated classes in
the urban townships. This is very general though, and it
is possible to probe deeper in order to understand why
community councils were set up.
Castells is illuminating here. He states that
"the intervention of the state (in'I Wanagement-
reproduction processes) becomes necessary in
order to take charge of the sectors and services
which are less profitable (from the point of view
of capital) but necessary for the functioning of
economic activity and/or the appeasement of social
conflicts.ie
In this light, the creation of community councils can be
seen on a number of interrelated, levels. In the first
instance, the councils were designed to take over, to some
extent, some areas of the provision and management of the
means of collective consumption — especially in the
sphere of housing — from the administration boards in the
townships. This was quite clearly a diversionary and
deflective tactic by the state: the board system had been
shown up as unworkable — so replace it in part with a
parallel body featuring 'popular' representation, but keep
overall power in your hands. Furthermore, in a period in
which the dominant classes were finding it increasingly
difficult to provide for some of the collective means of
consumption unproblematically — costs were high and
opposition to the state's functioning intense — it became
vital that
"black communities .. bear to an increasing extent
a greater part of the total burden in connection
with the provision of services in their own
communities"
to quote Riekert's words.19 The dominated classes were thus
to pay even more towards the cost of their own management
and reproduction, but instead of administration boards
doing the dirty work . . . community councils were to be
given "municipal status" and told to collect the rents. As
a speaker pointed out at a meeting which rejected community
councils in Mlungisi, Queenstown: "'ECAB (Eastern Cape
Administration Board) will say it is your people who are
arresting you1."20
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But 'ruling1 the townships obviously went slightly
further than this. The same speaker quoted above recognised
this:
"As community councils are a government creation for
black residents they must be seen as nothing more
than puppet bodies set up to create the appearance
of self-rule in the urban areas."21
"Puppet bodies" the community councils certainly were.
However, their creation also corresponded to the need of
the dominant classes, in a period of crisis, to somehow
extend participation in the political structures of the
(up to then) racially exclusive state. This participation
clearly was not to amount to much, but it did represent a
low-level political tactic for the co-option and containment
of parts of the urban African working class and sectors of
the petty bourgeoisie — to run their own townships (and
their own lives) and thus to 'rule' their 'own1 people.
In the final analysis then, community councils emerged
as state-created bodies for the better and smoother regu-
lation of management-reproduction processes in the townships;
a dubious 'concession' handed down by the state, imposed on
it by the struggle of the dominated classes and the demands
and needs of monopoly capital. The councils therefore were
both an effect of and an attempt to defuse struggles on the
state's part.22
THE COUNCILS CRAWL INTO ACTION
"In a nation ruled by swine, all pigs are upward-
mobile" - Dr. Hunter S. Thompson, c. 1971
The procedure for the establishment of councils was as
follows:
1. The Department of CAD gazetted that a community
council was to be established in a particular
township, usually within a period of six months.
2. The administration board responsible, having
consulted the UBC or advisory board in the area
if one or the other existed, then set a date for
an election.
3. The election took place. Most townships were
divided into wards for this purpose. Some elections
occurred along "ethnic" lines; others did not.
Only registered tenants in the township were allowed
to vote, sometimes including hostel dwellers. This,
of course, effectively excluded large numbers of
township residents.
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4. The (hopefully) elected council negoitiated with the
Minister and appropriate administration board as to
its duties. It was decided on what powers were to
be transferred.
5. In a heart-rending ceremony, the council was then in-
• ducted. The document handing over powers was signed
by representatives of both the council and the board.
This was usually effective for a year. Often high-
powered state officials such as the Deputy Minister
of CAD, Dr. G. de V. Morrison (who seemed to make
this somewhat of a speciality) made speeches. Such
paternalistic brilliance as "People have to crawl be-
fore they can walk",23 was showered forth upon those
present by this orator extraordinaire on more than one
occasion.
6. The community council crawled into full action.
Step 6, of course, was not the final one. CAD reviewed the
transfer of powers every year and on a basis of performance
or "necessity" handed down more powers — or took some away.
These additional transfers seemed to take place on a fairly
ad hoc basis — dependent on the sanction of the Minister
and that of Frans Cronje, the of ficial in CAD with1 the overall
responsibility for boards and councils. And in spite of
Section 5(1) (n) of the Act, the handing down of powers from
the boards could only go a certain distance--and no further.
The attainment of "full, independent municipal status" for
councils — as state officials so consistently and eagerly
put it — was not to be that easy in practice. When coun-
cillors reacted with disappointment to their powerlessness,
they were fobbed off with such statements as this one by
Morrison at the induction of the Kagiso council:
"But we don't want to give you powers you can't
handle. We are not afraid — but you don't have
the experience or the know-how."2h
Similarly, Koornhof stated at the jamboree inaugurating the
Diepmeadow Council in 1978, that
"The Act is a vehicle for a purpose. If the purpose
cannot be achieved by the vehicle, I will change
the vehicle to suit the purpose.'
Clearly, this was a long way from the naive demand articu-
lated by Steve Kgame — as President of the Urban Councils
Association of South Africa (UCASA), a co-ordinating body
set up in 1978 — that "the administration board officials
must take a back seat while you (councillors) drive the
car."26
The vehicle of the councils was aimed at regaining and
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extending control over the townships in the context of in-
tensified struggle. Thus the limits on the vehicle were
very much inbuilt, as we shall see. This was not to pre-
clude the unveiling of new models, however. We will con-
sider the question of the powers of councils as handed down
in the context of their operation below. Firstly, however,
we must look at the election process.
Information about elections was difficult to obtain and
very sketchy, with the obvious exception of Soweto. By April
1978 there were 18 councils; by the following April 160 —
and by 1980, as indicated already, over 200. There were 112
elections held by 1979 — with an average poll of 41,27%
according to CAD.27 This is manifestly an inflated percen-
tage — in fact, as the boards oversee all elections, any
percentages given (except the very low ones) are to be treated
warily. The first council was established in the Vaal Tra'ingle
in November 1977 with a percentage poll of about 20%.
Officials of the Department of BAD were delighted with this;
auspicious start to their new master-plan for control and
co-option. Their hopes took a nosedive by the end of April
the following year. An election and a by-election had been
held by that time in Soweto — in February and April respec-
tively. The events underlying and the details of these two
elections are well known — the October 1977 bannings, the
detention of the Committee of Ten, the freeing of some of
its members after the catastrophic first election, the pam-
phlets from the sky proclaiming "Be a historymaker and not
a sell-out"28 and Minister of PRAD, Connie Mulder's miserable
excuses. I cannot go into further detail here. Both elec-
tions though, saw a massive popular stayaway. Percentage
polls were 5,6% and 6% respectively, with only 3 600 out of
an eligible 60 000 (itself a tiny figure considering Soweto's
size) bothering to vote. The new 97-vote 'mayor' David
Thebahali — later to be called "that poisonous and ob-
noxious weed"29 — and his council took office without any
support from the majority (or even the minority, for that
matter) of Soweto inhabitants. This setback did not deter
CAD too much, however . Elections continued to take place
with monotonous regularity amid marked popular uninterest
and often, opposition. The percentage polls were, in many
cases though, significantly higher than in Soweto — par-
ticularly in smaller rural towns. Some examples were:
Daveyton (19,59%), Kwa Thema (19,75%) , Grahamstown (25,01%)
Fort Beaufort (70%), Bloemfontein (29%), Ermelo (32,6%)
Port Elizabeth (11,2%), Kimberley (37 ,61%) , Jacobsdal (54,8%)
Atteridgeville/Saulsville (25,8%), Ladysmith (26,4%) and
Witbank (25%). It should be noted that councils were often
formed for more than one township (e.g. the Vaal Triangle
council). The community council system was clearly to be
instituted, even in the face of stayaways from the polls
and other resistance. Before examining the powers the
councils actually received and the functions they fulfilled
— which were to have real effects on the management repro-
duction of the labour force in the townships — w e must make
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a few brief comments on the stances adopted towards
participation in the 'new1 bodies, and then look at who
did participate.
Debate on this vexed question has long historical roots.
For community councils it is possible to point to some
fairly consistent — and equally inconsistent — positions.
Bodies such as the Committee of Ten, its 'mass' successor
the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), and the Azanian
People's Organisation (A2AP0) and the Port Elizabeth Black
Civic Association (PEBCO) and its associates — as well
as many other civic and residents' associations all over
the country — have maintained, to this day, a stand of
non-participation. After all, these bodies were, and still
are, explicitly concerned with mobilizing-against the
actions of boards and councils. Motlana's statement below
summed up this stand to some extent — which is not to deny
the often significant differences existing between various
bodies:
"Until and only when that day comes that we blacks
have representation in the central government would
people like myself agree to serve ... The community
councils are a non-event and I refuse to dignify
them with a comment."31
PEBCO's stance on non-negotiation with and non-partici-
pation in what it called "dummy bodies" was also initially
implacable.3 2 Inkatha's position, however, was and
continues to be far more fluid. The possibly yes - possi-
bly no stance of 1978-79 — with Inkatha members appar-
ently contributing to high percentage polls in Natal with
their enthusiastic participation — was supplanted by a
definite 'no' in January, 1980 for the Soweto elections
to be held later that year- Then in April came Buthelezi's
stirring announcement on the participation issue at a
meeting at Vosloosrus:
"I say to you bluntly: do not be ashamed to enter
the fray at the level of community councils ...
(they) ... are not the vehicles of individual
enrichment. They must be turned into chariots
which rush us into battle ... I can see in the
short and medium term, blacks pouring their
strength into the community council system and
so joining one council to another so that the
very structure of division is turned into a
mechanism of unity."33
However, despite Buthelezi's fiery imagery (drawn, it
seemed, straight from Ben Huv or such, like) by late July
there had been second thoughts. Peter Davidson, PRO for
Inkatha on the Rand, insisting that "Inkatha is not
doctrinaire, but practical" stated that Inkatha would not
take part in the Soweto elections until the council was
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made financially viable — a process he seemed to equate
with it owning the land and houses in its area. Davidson
was of course implying that if the council could sell land
and houses people would not resist paying higher rents —
and only then would Inkatha participate. " Shortly after
this it was largely resistance to the actions of councils
that caused Koornhof to postpone the Soweto (and other)
elections — on the "request" of his 'mayors'. Inkatha
continued to vacillate though. In October 1980 it was
reported that Inkatha was preparing to take part in
future elections in Soweto and elsewhere.35
Buthelezi's comment in February 1981 that
"To me, to live in a'Native location' and refuse to
accept responsibility even for rubbish removal,
sewerage and schools while one lives there, shows
dangerous political immaturity."36
would appear to typify this 'new' stance.
It is, of course, not sufficient to examine the
participation issue without looking at the position and
electoral platform of those individuals and parties which
actually have taken part in elections. I cannot go into
detail here. One example — out of a multitude of parties
(often linked with bantustan parties and politics) all
over the country — is that of the Sofasanke Party in
Soweto in 1978, which stood on a ticket demanding free-
hold land tenure, the abolition of influx control and
electrification. Many similar examples could be quoted.
In essence though, we can broadly state that the councils,
in most cases, have in the past four years represented
the most conservative and reactionary of petty bourgeois
interests. The internal politics of the councils — the
•putch.es as chairman flit off to America on visits, to find
themselves replaced on their returns, the machinations of
ruling and opposition parties — can be seen as the
quintessence of petty bourgeois politics. Most councillors
have been drawn from the ranks of the traditional petty
bourgeoisie — as well as some from the new petty
bourgeoisie. They have often ceaselessly articulated
demands over such issues as business rights and freehold
land title — and their distance from the discourse and
practices of the working class, and significant sectors
of the new petty bourgeoisie — as from the realities of
exploitation — has been marked. Of course, given the
objective function of the councils as institutions to
control and manage the dominated classes, this is hardly
surprising.
It appears too that via the agency of community councils,
the state successfully created its own small-scale,
localised Matanzimas and Sebes in the townships.
Corruption has been a by-word in the functioning of the
councils. On the one level, this has meant jobs and
trading licences for pals. A example from the Vaal Triangle
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bears this out:
"Mr Kosilang (a councillor in opposition to the
ruling bloc on the Vaal Council) said, when a
business was advertised for occupation the
'favoured1 people knew in advance of the official,
announcement that they had been granted licences.
They openly boasted about it and to 'prove their
point they would immediately throw braaivleis
parties for the executive members of the council'."3 7
Such antics have not ended here though. Councillors
have often spent large amounts of time attempting to
increase their allowances, buying themselves 'mayoral'
cars, chains, liquor cabinets and robes, beating up their
enemies with their own private police/vigilante forces
and so on. Thebahali's gang in the Soweto Council, for
instance, continues to be a potent symbol of corrupt low-
level bureaucracy running high and wild. And, as if this
were not bad enough, the popularity of the councils has
not been helped by the contempt in which councillors often
hold the people of the townships. In a notorious incident
in 1980, a Manguang councillor described his constituents
— he claimed he was speaking of "stone-throwers" —
rather derogatorily:
"An African is like a baboon which you make to
sleep on a bed with white sheets and clean pillow,
but who still remains a baboon."38
Katlehong's mayor at the time M.B. Kumalo's benignly
contemptuous comment to me in an interview, that
"For negotiation purposes you don't want to go to
the masses ... they are scared to take decisions ...
I take decisions and I account for them in Katlehong
and on the East Rand" 39
is perhaps an instance of the same attitude, in vastly
altered form. The undemocratic and fundamentally coercive
activities of the community councils and the resistance
engendered were major factors leading to the failure of
the system and the rejection of Koornhof's "new deal" bills
of 1980.
So far we have painted a rather bleak picture of the
community council system: as agencies of control and
division, created by the state to extend co-optive but
effectively meaningless 'political' rights to sections
of the dominated classes on the urban terrain and to
ensure that the townships — site of the extended
reproduction of capital's workforce — continued to "pay
their own way." Monopolised by a small {and often corrupt)
segment of the petty bourgeoisie, the council strategy
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emerged therefore as one to revamp the management-
reproduction of labour power in the townships in the face
of ongoing popular struggle in this domain. Crucial here
were the powers and duties handed down to the councils.
The Act did have a certain degree of flexibility and how
the councils were implemented and empowered in different
townships was dependent on the level of militancy there,
the forms of organisation existent and the resistance to
their operation. These powers could only go a certain
distance. Administration boards retained their powers
over influx and labour control functions. And the other
powers and duties passed down from the boards appear to
have been, in most cases, rather limited, even within the
extremely circumscribed powers community'councils can
exert by law. Most councils seemed to acquire powers in
the same piecemeal way as the Soweto Council: firstly
control over housing, land and trading matters (as
specified in the Act) and permission to establish a
community guard in June 1978; then the power to draw up
its own budget and establish its own treasury (revenue
control and collection, control over capital.expenditure,
tenders, insurance and salaries) in June 1979; and then
control over its own salaried officials and staff as well
as seconded administration board officials in November/
December 1979."° The Soweto Council was, by the time of
the last step, supposed to be nothing less than a fully-
fledged municipality, and more powers could be granted
if the councils so requested, stated CAD officials.
Of course, this was nonsense. "Municipal autonomy"
was still a long way off for most councils by the end of
1979 — or 1980 for that matter. Moreover, few township
residents took the powers granted to the councils
seriously anyway. As a Soweto clerk commented after the
first "Councils get teeth" announcement in 1978:
"Whether these powers are good or bad is immaterial.
They have been given to the wrong people. We do
not know them, nor do we want them as we have
shown. I wonder if they will know what to do with
them?"1*1
The strategy was one that ensured that the responsibi-
lity for the provision and management of township services
-- the collective means of consumption in part -- fell
directly into the laps of the elected councils: "The
Community Councils must consider matters and take the rap
if things go wrong" as an ex-director or WRAB smugly put
it.1*2 Or, from the rather bemused and suddenly wise
perspective of a Soweto councillor: "The council has been
given the power to control and draw up its budget. But
the council is broke."1*3 And it was then that rents had
to be raised and popular mobilization to the- actions of
the councils grew, while the likes of Thebahali asked
innocently, "What's wrong with increasing rents?"1"*
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In this regard, the relationship between boards and
councils was critical. Rather than making the decisions
and having the administration boards execute them, the
councils emerged as nothing more than the boards' little
sisters'*5 - wearing their big sisters' clothes. The
boards — and CAD — still held the management power in
the townships and they were not to disappear suddenly.
Thus WRAB's new chief director, G.J. Bezuidenhout,
speaking in May 1980, stated that the boards would exercise
"creative withdrawals" from the controls in townships.
At the same time though, this creativity notwithstanding,
"there would always be room for the board as a co-ordinating
body somewhere between local government and central
government. " *•6
This relationship between the boards and councils caused
councillors all over the country — by 1980 some 15 00 to
2 000 of them — much heartache and many a sleepless night,
as they pondered the nightmare question: are we in charge
of runaway vehicles with no effective powers?
This outline of the operation and powers of the councils
must now be supplemented with analysis of how the system
fitted into the overall trajectory of state urban manage-
ment-reproduction policy in the period since 1977. Since
that time - and primarily as a consequence of intense and
continuing popular struggle and urban fiscal crisis - this
policy has been characterised by a developing "crisis
of state intervention on the crisis of the reproduction
of the labour force"1*7 - a crisis of urban policy, in
other words.
COMMUNITY COUNCILS AND URBAN POLICY 1977-1980
(a) Influx Control and Labour Allocation
In the period administration boards — and the
apparatus of commissioner's offices and courts and
the SAP — retained total authority over the influx and
labour control system. It was made explicit by the
Department of BAD, PRAD, and CAD functionaries on many
occasions in 1977, 1978 and 1979 that this control
function would not devolve on to community councils.
The enforcement of the pass laws was nevertheless tight-
ened to some extent, as hundreds of thousands continued
to be,prosecuted in assembly-line courts and'rehabili-
tated ' in aid centres. Legislation in 1978 provided
for the extension of the removal of "idles and undesira-
bles." It was in 1978 and 1979 though, that the state's
overall strategy in the influx control sphere became
clearer: an extremely
All Little Sisters 15
"limited relaxation of controls entirely
conditional upon the increased efficiency and
severity of controls over the section of the urban
African population not considered to be 'established'
in the towns.1"*8.
— coupled with a gradual assault on Section 10
qualifications in general. The African dominated classes
were to be divided into 'insiders' and 'outsiders' : the
1
 insiders' those legally in the cities necessary for
(primarily monopoly) capitalist production and granted
effectively meaningless consumption and 'political' conces-
sions (better houses, community councils); the 'outsiders'
the unemployed and marginalized, removed to the bantustans,
where the Mphephus and Sebes could look after them. Thus,
according to the Riekert Report masterplan, influx control
would be more closely tied to housing and employment
availability. In 1979 for example, legislation was made
for the harsher punishment of those who employed "illegals"
(a R500 fine). However, analysis in terms of 'insiders'
and 'outsiders' must not ".blind us to two fundamental and
interconnected facts:
(i) that the 'insiders' are to remain 'outsiders'
in their own country. It does not appear that
the urban dominated classes are to exert their
national political rights anywhere but in the
bantustans;
ii) that as noted, the state is engaged in a pro-
cess of whittling away Section 10 qualifications.
The passing of the Black Laws Amendment Act in
1978 — which prevented children born to 'Citizens'
of 'independent' bantustans after they became
1
 independent' from obtaining Section 10 (1) (a)
and (b) qualifications — made this clear, as did
Koornhof's influx bills of 1980.^9
Removals continued, pass laws continued to be savagely
enforced and the "blackjacks" still terrorised the townships.
The labour bureaux still functioned all over the country.
In spite of all the 'reformist' initiatives presented to
the masses by the state — the influx-efflux control system
still remained — functional (although not uncontradictorily)
to political class domination and class exploitation in
South Africa.
(b) Housing
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 The involvement of the community councils in housing
and residential control was very significant. As we indi-
cated in the previous section, many councils (the exact
figures are unknown) were granted most of the powers in
this sphere provided for in the legislation. In effect,
these councils became responsible for the allocation and
management of housing in their areas — while still under
the watchful eye of the administration boards. And this,
of course, was in the context of increased state and mono-
poly capital involvement in the housing 'problem1 and the
upgrading of the "quality of life." In addition to the
extravagent planning schemes which were discussed ad nauseum
by the dominant classes, the following measures were taken:50
(i) Increased state capital expenditure — the R25O
million housing package(R50 million for African
housing in the 'white' areas) announced in 19 7 7
was vital here. Of course, in the long run, the
dominated classes were still to pay this back
through rents, etc.
(ii) The institution of the 9 9-year leasehold scheme
in 1978, and the limiting of superintendent/
manager's powers in 1979 to facilitate this.
(iii) The abolition of the Black Housing Board in 1979
— and the granting of sub-economic housing
loans to Africans from the same year onwards.
(iv) The acceptance by the state of most of the
Riekert Commission's recommendations on housing.
(v) The pouring of funds into the townships by the
capitalist classes (e.g. the Urban Foundation) and
also employers increasingly contributing "towards
alleviating the desperate need for housing for
their workers."51
The last-mentioned point is of the greatest significance.
The housing crisis so clearly visible by 1976-77 had to be
relieved somehow — Riekert calculated that by the end of
1977 there was a shortage of 141 000 houses and 126 000
hostel beds, and that by 1982 this would have dropped only
to 132 000 and 113 000 respectively.52 Some measure of
destatisation was urgently needed — an index of the impos-
sibility for the state of effectively providing and managing
this collective means of consumption — and the calls for
increasing capitalist involvement in housing came thick and
fast from the state. As Deputy Minister of the Department
of Bantu Administration, Willem Cruywagen, put it as a cere-
mony to open show houses in Sebokeng in 1977.
"The provision of housing to satisfy the needs of
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all people is the mutual responsibility of both the
public and the private sectors in contemporary
society."5 3
But all of this could only be the literal drop in the
ocean. The state continued to build towns and houses in
the bantustans — and the number of commuters5" and the
number of bus boycotts grew. The backlog of houses and
beds remained and it was calculated that it would cost
well over Rl 000 million to meet it by 1982.5S Equally,
the provision of "elite townships for the rapidly develo-
ping Black middle classes"56 — the 'new1 divisive
strategy in this area of collective consumption — did not
proceed too quickly. Very few 99-year leaseholds had been
granted by the end of 1980.57 The new era of (different)
houses for all was slow in coming.
The increasing responsibilities of community councils
in this sphere did not help at all. Rather then deflecting
township anger, the councils instead focused it — on
themselves. Inheriting the deficits of the BAABs (which
increased after the destruction of the beerhalls), the
councils were soon in above their heads. Huge and super-
ficially impressive budgets were drawn up, but the funds
were not there. And, as services continued to deteriorate
and the councils became more involved in the running of
people's lives in the townships, opposition and anger grew.
The fact that the councils were seen as being a puppet-like
extension of the administration boards did not help matters
for the state. "Those whites are just using you to
oppress us", said the leader of an opposition body to the
Evaton Community Council at a meeting the council had
called.50 But it was — and continues to be — the state's
transparent strategem in placing the responsibility for
raising rents in the hands of the councils that caused the
most virulent popular anger and opposition. To understand
this we must examine the financing of councils more closely
(c) ' Finance 5 9
The financial crisis in the townships was and continues
to be one of the state's main problems in the sphere of
the management-reproduction of labour power. Both the
Riekert and the Browne Commission were to agonize over this
issue. Basically though, the establishment of the community
councils saw the state's policy of financial self-sufficiency
for the townships unchanged. Riekert's recommendation that
the dominated classes pay move towards the cost of their
own reproduction further entrenched this policy — and no
further sources of funding were provided. Employer levies
were increased by 20% in 1977G0 but capital was unhappy
with this, and Riekert suggested the gradual phasing out
of these as a result. Thus, in drawing up their budgets
the councils soon realised (or were told) that if they
wanted to provide amenities and services in the townships
(and if they did not there would be considerable anger)
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they would have to raise, rents. As John Knoetze, the
Chairman of WRAB, so succinctly stated in 1980.
"Now it's up to the Soweto Council to find ways
of getting the money .. either from the residents
or from employers, but definitely not from us as
our resources are now dry."61
The councils, running on empty, were thus forced to
attempt to increase rents — or components of them6 2 —
and face the mobilization and resistance of their
constituents.
In the post 1977 period then, rents rocketed in
townships all over South Africa.63 But so did resistance.
While the state examined ways to improve the funding of
the townships, civic and residents' associations emerged
to fight their administration on many issues - notably
rents and transport. Motlana was quoted as saying such
things as
"You moved Soweto twenty miles outside of town.
For your convenience. It's your baby. You
finance it. There's no way in which the people
of Soweto can finance it by themselves "6"
on many occasions and this does exemplify a particular
stance often taken by township residents. In a number of
cases the increased rents were not paid, so strong was
popular organization and commitment. And it was the
councils which had to cajole and then try to enforce
inhabitants of the townships to pay up. In fact, very
often, it was the way in which rent hikes were announced
(or rather not announced) that added to popular indigna-
tion. Boards merely announced the increases through the
councils — which then had to go and evict people, nail
doors shut and so on. "people look upon us as rubber
stamps" said a Soweto councillor angrily in 1980, referring
to the way in which township managers made the councillors
do their dirty work.65 it was, after all, one of the
council's powers. Furthermore the financial idiosyncracies
of the boards themselves contributed to the mess —
donating sums to SABRA and investing in banks which
collapsed shortly afterwards, for instance.
Clearly, with regard to the financial situation, the
formation of community councils, rather than deflecting
attention away from the repressiveness and inefficiency
of administration in the ownships, instead sharpened ten-
sions and contradictions — and stimulated popular
mobilization.
(d) "Free Enterprise"
Of course, one of the problems contributing to the
fiscal crisis in the townships was their lack of a tax
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base, owing to the paucity of businesses in them. Over
the past few years the state has tried to make a start in
solving this problem —, so that the townships can really
pay more for themselves. Thus, most restrictions on
African traders and businessmen were lifted in November
1977 and September 1978. We should note though, that
there were still long delays in allocating sites, that
traders were often prevented from altering and improving
their buildings and that permission had to be obtained
from boards and councils to dispose of trading licences.66
And freehold land tenure was still not granted, although
there were vague hints that this long-awaited concession
was on its way.
Meanwhile the state took other steps ..to start stimula-
ting "free enterprise" in the townshipsJ It appointed
Louis Rive, ex-Postmaster-General, to head the Soweto
Planning Council to plan and develop Soweto in conjunction
with the Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow councils. One
of the main objectives of Rive's "fantastic mission", as
he described it himself67, was to look into the question
of business development. In that year as well one of
Riekert's recommendations on business was accepted —
notably that of allowing 'white' capital into the townships
(up to 49% of shares in a business). Community councils
were to oversee this process, as well as continue to
allocate trading sites and licences.
Here, there were problems as African businessmen often
opposed 'white' capital's entry. The often bad relation-
ships often existing between councils and local NAFCOC
branches did not improve matters either - these possibly
due to the penchant of the councils to award trading
licences to the family and friends of councillors — not
to mention themselves. in 1980 the state announced that
shebeens were to be legalised and then Rive stated that
small-scale industrial parks were to be developed in the
townships. The arbitrary and often ridiculous policies
of the councils continued to cause friction with 'excluded'
businessmen. NAFCOC asked to be allowed to take over the
administration boards' liquor businesses69 while its
President Sam Motsuenyane, continued to demand freehold
tenure. "How can you make anyone a capitalist without
ownership of property?" he asked at an Assocom conference
in 1980.*9
In the final analysis .then, community councils were
(and continue to be) inextricably linked to the whole state
initiative to 'develop' the townships industrially and
commercially. And their role here too even managed to
some extent, to alienate certain sectors of such bodies as
NAFCOC70 — further contributing to the total rejection
of the council system by the vast majority of people in the
townships.
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(e) Conclusion
I hope I have shown that the activities of the community
councils in management-reproduction processes in the
townships effectively aggravated existing contradictions and
created new ones. Truly then, in this case certainly,
•state intervention in the urban crisis produce(d) new
popular struggles"7- — deepening and broadening the crisis
of urban policy. Here we have not even mentioned the role
of the councils in forming community guards — so hated by
the townships, or the way that councils often controlled
the 'blackjacks.; or their draconian social welfare
policies; or the uselessness and ineffectualness of the
national body, UCASA, riven as it has been by petty
squabbles.72 Moreover, we should not forget that the role
of the boards scarcely diminished in the townships —
there were "two bulls in one kraal"73as Steve Kgame so
eloquently put it, with both boards and councils controlling
the townships. The system thus did not change too much,
and the changes that were made merely sharpened popular
resentment and resistance. Over the past years it was
struggle that placed major limits on the implementation of
the state's new policies — and struggle that effected their
unworkability and the endless drafting of "new deals" as
a result.
"COMMUNITY COUNCILS ARE DOOMED"71* —OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE
1977-80
State intervention in the townships in the post 1977
period certainly incited "the politicisation of protest".75
Castells' statement that
"Contradictions developing in the sphere of
collective consumption, and conflicts originating
in urban organisation, tend ... to be more or less
directly reflected back on to state intervention
and underlying political trends" re
was proved over and over again, as the popular classes
organised and protested against the actions of administration
boards and community councils — often winning significant
victories.
The resistance of the popular classes to the activities
of the state in the townships in the sphere of management-
reproduction controlled by the boards and councils caused
the massive reject-ion of the council system: as state-
created "screens for keeping the masses at a distance" they
definitely "turn(ed) out to be veritable sounding boards
or amplifiers of popular struggle."77
Thus in the context of widespread militancy on every
conceivable terrain and swiftly-developing grassroots
organisation in factories, school and townships — all of
which I cannot detail here — the period saw an intensifica-
tion of urban struggles. To a greater extent than before
these struggles saw the mobilization of broad sectors of
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township inhabitants in democratic organization, and the
linking of management-reproduction issues with the
structures of exploitation and oppression in South Africa
— and broader long-term political objectives.
Almost every township in the country the residents
resisted and mobilised against the way their everyday
lives were controlled by the state in the form of admini-
stration boards and community councils. All over South
Africa, township residents formed civic associations to
fight the administration boards and community councils,
protested against and boycotted rent and service charge
increases, called upon community councils to resign,
protested against housing shortages, squatted in reaction
to these shortages, resisted township removals and boy-
cotted bus fare increases. Outbreaks of 'violence' and
'rioting' - these including attacks on individual
community councillors - were also increasingly prevalent.
The significance of these outbreaks - always a very real
threat to the state's physical power and presence in the
townships - should not be underrated. And the impact
of all the struggles mentioned above was less important
on. individual townships than on public opinion and the
general formulation of urban policy.76
It is really too early to provide any rigorous analysis
of the struggles post-1977. I will merely make a few
brief comments. On the one level, the struggles do
demonstrate "the multi-class character of urban contra-
dictions" 79 - as these contradictions do affect all
classes in the townships. This should not be overstated
though. A recognition of "the growing homogenity in the
interests of all popular classes"80 on the urban terrain
must be tempered with an awareness of the way state
intervention, for instance, is designed to divide the
popular classes. The 'reform' instituted during the
community councils era, however, seem to have been accep-
ted only by the most reactionary elements of the petty
bourgeoisie in the townships. And here I am largely
referring to the traditional petty bourgeoisie. The new
petty bourgeoisie has proved to be less easy to 'co-opt'
— or contain. But this question of "homogenity" of course
is linked to the way that struggles are fought and
alliances formed.
These struggles described above often took the form
of 'defensive1, 'spontaneous' responses to state policies
and practices. They often went beyond this though drawing
the links between wages and rents, between workplace and
'community' issues, between struggles in the factories
and struggles in the townships, between urban issues and
the broader national political struggle. Elements of
leadership emerged in each struggle. As Gramsci pointed
out
"The fact (is) that every 'spontaneous' movement
contains rudimentary elements of conscious
leadership, of discipline ... This unity between
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'spontaneity1 and 'conscious leadership' or
'discipline' is precisely the real political
action of the subaltern classes."6
The dangers of struggles becoming too specific to
particular urban issues, of undemocratic organisational
and leadership practices, subordinating working class
interests while adopting overly legalistic or non-
participatory tactics are apparent. But equally clearly,
urban struggles can be articulated with broader political
struggles as vehicles for organisation and mobilization.
It is in these struggles that alliances can be made, and
working class hegemony forged. Given the' location of urban
contradictions over the perceived capitalist management
and reproduction of the labour force in the townships in
the overall structure of exploitation and national oppres-
sion under which the majority of South Africans suffer,
such imperatives, objectively facilitated in a sense by
state intervention on the urban terrain, appear possible
— and fundamental. As Castells states, "It all depends
on the ability of ... political movements to recognise
and direct1102 the movements of urban protest which emerged
and continue to do so in South Africa — incited by urban
contradictions and the attempts of the dominant classes
to resolve these.
Up to this point we have shown that the community
council system merely aggravated urban contradictions
and the crisis of management-reproduction in the townships
primarily by inciting popular struggles of an unrivalled
breadth and combativity. These struggles truly placed
limits on the implementation of the dominant classes' 'new'
urban strategy — a rather vacuous programme of intensi-
fied control, disguised as 'reform' and 'development',
with certain sectors of the urban African population
recognized, in effect, as permanent "temporary sojourners".
But popular struggle in the townships, intense as it was
and continues to be, does not mean that the dominant
classes did not have still more 'remedies' as the crisis
of management-reproduction was extended into a crisis of
state intervention on this — a crisis of urban policy
in effect*
It is in this context that we must now turn to a brief
examination of Koornhof's "new deal" bills of 1980-1 -
the fullest attempt by the state up to that time to come
to terms with the crisis of reproduction and urban policy.
(a) The Background
On 31st July 1980, in the context of a massive upsurge
of popular struggle all over South Africa, Minister of
CAD, Dr. Piet Koornhof, announced that the Soweto community
council elections, scheduled for 2 7th September, would be
postponed until 1982. Koornhof claimed that this step
had been taken on the request of Soweto's 'mayor', David
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Thebahali, in order that the council be able to "finish
its present projects", in the latter's words. Koornhof
further stated that the state was to introduce legislation
in 1981 providing for the development of community
councils into fully-fledged local authorities — as
recommended by the Riekert Commission. Council elections,
therefore, should wait for this new "new era" to dawn;
those councils which had elections falling before December
1981 were eligible for this postponement — and all they
had to do was ask, like Thebahali.83 The facts that
rents were to rise in Soweto — and many other townships
— before September, and that the widely discredited
Soweto Council faced an enormous popular stayaway from
the polls in the context of mobilization over the rents
issue were not, of course, mentioned. Quite clearly
though, increased resistance engendered by the operation
of the councils countrywide had necessitated a rethinking
of the system.
In the next few months, councils in Daveyton, the Vaal
Triangle, Kwa Thema and Mamelodi announced the postpone-
ment of elections. CAD officials continued to hint at
the exciting "new deal" just over the horizon. At the
end of October, a scant few weeks after Koornhof's
catastrophic visit to Soweto to receive the "freedom" of
the township, this was finally unveiled in the form of
three draft bills. These represented the fullest attempt
to resolve the ongoing crisis of management-reproduction
and urban policy. The 'reforms' and 'concessions' since
1976-77 had manifestly not eased urban contradictions —
indeed they had, in many ways, only exacerbated them,
inciting more and more urban protests. The "new deal"
bills were designed to cope with this, as the State's
reformulated masterplan for the management and control of
the townships, based on the Riekert Commission's
recommendations and those of the Regional Committees set
up in 19 7 9 to advise the Cabinet Committee on "urban
blacks".
(b) Riekert's Recommendations
We have already briefly discussed the commission's
recommendations on influx control and their implementation,
These were aimed at the division of Africans into urban
'insiders' and rural 'outsiders', with the availability of
housing and employment in the cities and towns becoming
a crucial mechanism of control. I will go into no further
detail here. It is the Commission's recommendations on
the restructuring of the pivots of township management-
reproduction — administration boards and community
councils — that are our primary concern. These were
meant to be finally encapsulated in the legislative form
of a proposed Black Community Development Act, for which
the report gave a full outline.84
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At the outset, Riekert suggested that CAD itself be
'rationalised', surrendering some of its functions to
other departments, while remaining in charge of bantustan
'development' and the administration of urban townships
— controlling administration boards and community councils
The latter would continue gradually to be granted powers
to run the townships. But this must be seen in the
context of the commission's recommendations for the
restructuring of administration boards. These were that:
(i) their name should be altered to Regional Boards
for Black Community Development;
(ii) their constitutions be changed to allow experts
from the state and the private sector to sit
on them;
(iii) provision be made for two sub-committees, one
to deal with labour, housing and administration,
and the other with community development —
planning and determining priorities for the
'upgrading' of the townships;
(iv) local government functions be transferred
gradually from the boards to community councils
by the Minister;
(v) the Economic Development Corporation (EDO be
involved in the development of trade and service
industries on an economic basis in the
townships;
(vi) staff be trained and 'Africanisation' take place
in administration — with the Public Service
Commission playing a major role in this;
(vii) the 'development' of the townships take place
on an economic (non-subsidised) basis.8 5
The future, according to Riekert, was obviously to see
an increasing of the powers of community councils and an
intensification of township 'upgrading1, for which the
residents would themselves pay. The white paper on the
commission accepted all of the recommendations listed
above, except the fifth one. The EDC was not the right
agency for the task apparently.
(c) The Bills86
In essence, all three bills followed Riekert's recom-
mendations fairly closely.
The Black Community Development Bill provided for a
'modernised' system of influx control. Section 10
qualifications were abolished, and basically only those
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people with state-approved accommodation and employment
were to be allowed to remain in the cities and towns. 99-
year leaseholders were to be high on the list of the
wanted. The penalties for "illegals" were increased.
The "dompas" was to remain, as was the power of the
Minister to establish and demolish townships — and
resettle people. The only 'concession1 provided for —
that of allowing qualified people to move from one control
area to another, subject to the availability of housing
and employment — had already been embodied in the June
1980 labour regulations. In the final analysis, the bill
emerged as an extension and intensification of already
existing influx control policies and practices, directed
at dividing and controlling the African dominated classes
— paltry 'concessions' for those necessary to capitalist
production, and dumping for "illegals", the unemployed
and the marginalized. It was perceived as such and was
met with widespread public disavowal.
The other bills predictably gave flesh to Riekert's
proposals on administration boards and community councils-
In terms of the Laws on Co-operation and Development
Amendment Bill, the former were to be restructured as
smaller development boards, with a chairman, six members
nominated by the Minister, some on account of their
expertise, inter alia, in local government and town
planning, and others because of their "expert" knowledge
of industry, commerce and farming in the board area. To
some extent these membership provisions represented a
streamlining of the boards, mirroring state restructuring
on other levels. But this should not be over-estimated:
the involvement of 'experts' in an attempt to overcome
the "bureaucratic ponderousness or administrative inertia"& 7
inscribed in the structure of the boards was not fundamen-
tally to alter the form or function of the boards. Their
scope of operation and total control by the Minister was
to remain essentially similar, apart from the renewed
exphasis on development (provided for in the bill, for
instance, by the institution of the sub-committees envi-
saged by Riekert). Financial sources remained unaltered,
except for the provision of a new Revolving Fund which
was to receive loan funding from the state. The new
boards were also to be allowed to co-operate with muni-
cipalities to provide township services. in the final
analysis, the development boards were merely to be a
rationalised version of "baasskap administration",
designed to become gradually responsible for planning and
overseeing the administration and 'upgrading' of the
townships, while the revamped community councils did the
day-to-day control work.
Of course, town and village councils (as the community
councils were to be called according to the Local
Government Bill) were only to be allowed to do this
gradually as well. Most councils were to become village
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councils, while some (presumably in the bigger townships)
were to be renamed town councils — and to have "full
municipal autonomy." A Director of Local Government was
to ensure the implementation of the bill, but final con-
trol, as before, lay with the Minister. There is really
very little that can be said about this bill. Village
councils appeared to be an unchanged version of community
councils while the powers of town councils were not
specified — it was again to be up to the Minister to
decide. Likewise, the Minister was to have the power of
veto over virtually anything the councils might do, as
well as being able to authorise someone to ensure that a
council kept on functioning. Fiscal sources remained the
same, with the exception that influx control fines were
to go to the councils —• no doubt to encourage them to
take over the control of influx in their areas. The
councils were not to own land, cutting down further on
the possibilities for increased revenue. The 'new'
village and town councils emerged from the legislation
as another undemocratic body for ruling the townships, in
essence very little changed from the previous model.
Still the boards' little sisters, their growth was to be
severely limited by CAD. It is no wonder that Steve
Kgame eventually described the council bill as a "raw
deal".88 Pretty words obviously meant very little any
more — even to Kgame and his 2 000 councillors.
Wide-spread protest forced the state to withdraw the
"new deal" bills by February 1981.
The appearance — and the withdrawal — of the bills
was yet another manifestation of the crisis of urban
management-reproduction and urban policy facing the
dominant classes. The attempts by the state to resolve
the urban crisis prevailing since 1976-77 by "maximising
the integration of certain sectors of the dominated
classes into the order which it represents while main-
taining this order by repression"8^ had not been success-
ful and had, in fact, the effect of further politicizing
contradictions on the urban terrain. The combination of
"domination-integration"30 characterizing urban policies
since 1976-77 merely led to a crisis of urban policy.
The state had been forced to try to make concessions on
the urban terrain, in response to popular democratic
demands. But these concessions were not real — they
were designed to divide and control — and were too little
and too late.
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION
After the withdrawal of the bills, the state announced
the convening of the Grosskopf committee, whose task it
was
"to simplify ... (the bills) in accordance with
the contents and spirit of the Riekert Report
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and the government white Paper".9 1
In the past year then, we seem to have entered the era
of Riekert Mk 2. The last twelve months have witnessed a
continuation of the crisis of the townships - along with
intensified state attempts to find a policy or set of
policies for "accommodating the Urban Black"92. Indeed
state activities in the past year arguably augur for a
more 'integrated' approach toward solving the urban crisis
- as one part of a proposed "total programme for meeting
the future on a more realistic basis,' 3 (or "total
strategy" Mk 2?).
The past year then has seen, if anything the dimensions
of the urban crisis steadily enlarging. Influx control,
according to Sheena Duncan, has become more rigid as more
people became hungry as unemployment in the bantustans
soared. "9lt Labour recruitment in the bantustans was
reduced, more money was spent on enforcing influx control
- and the year was further marked by the massive and
vicious pass raids in the Western Cape and on the East
Rand.
The housing situation has further deteriorated in every
township in South Africa. The housing shortage grew -
with state functionaries often quoting the "official"
figure of 420 000 houses needed (160 000 in the Durban
townships, 106 000 for squatters in white areas and
154 000 in the bantustans) now at a cost of R3,36Om. "what
is at stake here", said Dr. G. Morrison, Deputy-Minister
of CAD, "is nothing less than the future well-being of
our entire economic system"95 and J.H.T. Mills, Director-
General of CAD, called for "a new approach" to housing,
to "give the black man a deal to make him stand on our
side against the enemy.96
We will deal with the slow unfolding of the "approach"
shortly; for now we must merely note the failure of the
99 year lease system (only 1200 by the end of 1981) , the
worsening of services in the townships - and the continual
raising of rents by the administration boards and community
councils.
The rent hikes - apart from inciting mobilization and
resistance by residents - have not helped alleviate the
financial weaknesses of the boards. Criticism of wasteful
fiscal policies of the boards has grown. Up to now we
have rather neglected the fact of the unprofitability of
the state's provision and regulation of collective
consumption processes in the townships. However, it does
need to be emphasized that this is a major factor underly-
ing the crisis of urban policy now prevailing, conjoined
as it is to the patterns of popular militancy. The
state, simply is in great financial trouble in the
townships. Deficits are mounting and it is becoming more
and more evident that the state cannot by itself cope
with the provision and distribution of the means of
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collective consumption in the townships.
The state has made efforts to relieve this situation,
but up to now these have not exactly been crowned with
success. The Riekert Report indicated its concern over
the funding of administration boards and community councils,
but pointed out this was outside its terms of reference.
The solutions were to be provided by the Browne Commission,
set up to look into the financing of local authorities.
The report of the commission though, published in June
1980, proved to be a disappointment for the state. In
fact, the Browne Report provided no real suggestions
as to how to alleviate the fiscal crisis to the townships,
beyond recommending the encouragement of home ownership
in the townships, that the 20% of liquor profits now paid
to CAD should be kept by the boards and that the boards'
agency services (e.g. bantustan development) be transferred
to CAD or other state apparatuses.97 in the meantime the
deficits of councils and boards are growing rapidly -
Soweto's, for instance is Rl,5m a month - and reports flow
in regularly of financial mismanagement by the boards.
And then, in the context of rising unemployment and
inflation, with recession looming on the horizon - along
with the growth of a broad-based non-racial popular
democratic alliance - popular struggle in the townships
has shown no signs of abating. The past year has seen
struggle and resistance against the actions of admini-
stration boards and community councils - and demands for
more and better homes and living conditions - in Soweto,
Tembisa, Sebokeng (the three biggest urban townships),
Kagiso, Daveyton, Thokoza, Evaton, Mzioni, Moklakeng,
Mamelodi, Langa, Nva^nga, Guguletu, Zwide - and in other
townships as well.\8 The community councils have gained
no further legitimacy whatsoever, and still remain utterly
discredited. It has become increasingly clearer that the
actual - and potential - resistance of residents places
the major limits on the state in the townships. The state
can only go so far - with raising rents for instance -
and no further.
What has the state done then, to find a solution to the
crisis of management-reproduction and of general policy
in the townships in the past year. in general terms we
can say that the state - and monopoly capital - are at
present rethinking urban policy yet again. And as the
urban crisis - and rural poverty and devastation
concommittantly - have sharpened, the state has begun
more and more to look for an overall solution - "a balanced
development strategy" in the words of Dr. Flip Smit, newly
appointed scientific adviser on housing and urbanization
to Koornhof." What this is to mean, again according to
Smit, is
"More balanced urban development, Liaison amongst
urban authorities themselves and within the rural
areas a policy of deliberate urbanization as part
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of an integrated development strategy". 100
Regional development, renewed deconcentration and
decentralization of industry and devolution of financial
responsibilities to local authorities (including community
councils) are now serious state proposals. And behind
all this, of course, lies popular struggle and fiscal
crisis in'the cities', townships and countryside -
together with the frightful demographic spectre for the
dominant classes of 28m "urban blacks" by the year 2000
- and the necessity for another ten Sowetos."
It is the above context that we must see the following
recent measures: the state's acceptance^ of the Viljoen
Committee's recommendations facilitating increased
"private sector" involvement in the housing problem; the
apparent resolution of the inter-state conflict between
CAD and the Department of Community Development over site
and service/self-help/ core housing in favour of CAD, the
proponent of the above measures; the increasing of
control by CAD over administration boards through the
enlarged van der Walt Commission and the state's new
deconcentration and decentralization proposals.102
It is also in this light that the upcoming new "new
deal" for the urban African townships must be situated.
The first of the Grosskopf - modified bills has already
appeared. It deals with community councils. However, the
Black Local Authorities Bill seems a largly unchanged
version of the Local Government Bill of October 1980 -
apart from slightly lessening the Minister of CAD's
discretionary powers, and removing the provisions for the
state and bantustan governments to nominate councillors103.
The bill has now been referred to a Parliamentary Select
Committee; the nation awaits the other two which are to
appear either this year or next year.
It seems evident however that there are two prongs to
the state's 'new' strategy for the management-reproduction
of the labour force in the townships. The first of these
is to attempt to increase slightly the powers and status
of community councils. This is obviously necessary, given
the total failure of the councils up to now — a failure
largely owing to the resistance against them. Put simply,
the councils (in whatever name) have to be made to look as
though they have power in the townships — even if they
do not. In conjunction with this is the second prong:
the stepping up of the 'development' of the townships (with
Louis Rive's Soweto Planning Council the prototype for
this initiative), while at the same time it becomes
apparent to the state that more (monopoly) capitalist
intervention in the townships is necessary if the grand
plan for solving the crisis in the townships is to have
the remotest chance of getting off the ground. And
'improved' community councils are on the agenda to make
sure that the African dominated classes in the townships
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begin to pay even more towards the cost of their own
management and reproduction.
In fact, in many ways, the community council system,
revamped, remains the "focal point" of the forthcoming
"stable, humane dispensation for urban blacks"105- The
"economic viability" of the councils is of "cardinal
importance"106 for solving the state's problems in the
townships - or shifting them sideways at least. The state
has appointed the Steyn and Croeser Commissions to
investigate this "economic viability" issue - and with the
postponed council elections scheduled for September this
year this is clearly a top priority for the state. But
with cutbacks in the CAD and Community Development budgets
for 1982/3, it promises to be a long, cold winter before
the spring.
I hope that I have shown that the crisis of management-
production and the crisis of urban policy - the causes and
dimensions of which have been analysed - remain manifest
in townships all over South Africa,
The state must attempt to resolve this in the long-term
interests of the dominant classes as a whole. And this
task is complicated - if not made impossible- by the
ongoing struggles in the townships as residents organize
to demonstrate their fundamental opposition to the way
their daily lives are run in the interests of the dominant
classes.
Such struggles will continue until power and 'profits'
are distributed equally in South Africa. Indeed, they
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